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Abstract 
 
Social interactions occur when agents in a network affect other agents’ choices directly, as opposed to 
via the intermediation of markets. The study of such interactions and the resultant outcomes has long 
been an area of interest across a wide variety of social sciences. With the advent of electronic media 
that facilitate and record such interactions, this interest has grown sharply in the business world as 
well. In this paper, we provide a brief summary of what is known so far, discuss the main challenges 
for researchers interested in this area and provide a common vocabulary that will hopefully engender 
future (cross-disciplinary) research. The paper considers the challenges of distinguishing actual causal 
social interactions from other phenomena that may lead to a false inference of causality. Further, we 
distinguish between two broadly defined types of social interactions that relate to how strongly 
interactions spread through a network. We also provide a very selective review of how insights from 
other disciplines can improve and inform modeling choices. Finally, we discuss how models of social 
interaction can be used to provide guidelines for marketing policy and conclude with thoughts on 
future research directions. 
 
 
(*) This paper is based on a session titled “Interdependent Choices and Social Multipliers: Identification, 
Empirical Methods and Policy Implications” (with the same participants) that was part of the Seventh Triennial 
Invitational Choice Symposium hosted by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School in Philadelphia 
during June 13-17, 2007.  The authors would like to thank the organizers, Eric Bradlow and Robert Meyer of the 
Wharton School, for giving them an opportunity to be a part of the symposium. All correspondence may be 
addressed to the co-chairs at Hartmann_Wesley@gsb.stanford.edu, pmanchan@bus.umich.edu and 
harikesh.nair@stanford.edu. 
 2
1 Introduction 
The increasing recognition of the role of social interactions in various domains (e.g. social-networking 
on sites such as MySpace.com or Facebook.com, and social-search on Yahoo!) has spurred renewed 
interest in modeling and understanding the implications of interactions among agents. These 
interactions are of primary importance to firms and policy-makers because they allow a stimulus to 
one individual to be magnified by its dispersion through the network.  In some cases, an intervention 
such as a marketing message to an individual (e.g., via an advertising exposure) can spillover to others 
in a network, allowing them to learn about a product despite not being directly exposed to the 
advertisement.  In other cases, network members may not only share information or spread phenomena 
through the network, but may actually care about whether others make similar choices.  In these latter 
cases, an agent’s actions generate a feedback to the agent through the choices of other network 
members, thereby multiplying the effect of any initial stimulus to the agent.  In both cases, social 
interactions imply that the aggregate level effect of marketing activity to agents becomes much larger 
than the just the sum of the individual-level effects.   
Academic progress in modeling and understanding social interactions is likely to have implications for 
both policy makers and industry. Policy makers will benefit from the facilitation of improved design 
and measurement of social interventions. Industry will benefit from the development of rigorous 
metrics for making informed decisions. While spending on social network advertising is already at 
$280 million (about 2% of all online advertising spending) and expected to reach about $2 billion (6% 
of all online advertising) in 2010, currently, there is little understanding and consensus on the 
definition of social networking and the measurement of the effectiveness of advertising on these sites 
(AMA 2007). Our hope is that this paper will stimulate further progress on this front. 
The existing literature in this area comes from a variety of academic disciplines including 
development economics, industrial organization, sociology, computation and marketing. Each 
discipline emphasizes varying research questions using differing methodologies. There exist immense 
economies-of-scope in bridging these disciplines and bringing these differing approaches to bear on 
solving common problems of interest. We offer a selective discussion of the state-of-the art across 
these disciplines. Our goal is to summarize the progress made, to highlight the current challenges, and 
to attempt to provide a common vocabulary for engendering cross-disciplinary research. Since the 
field is vast, we do not by any means, attempt or claim to provide a comprehensive summary.  Rather, 
we consider examples from the literature to help us articulate a unifying framework that helps identify 
actual causal social interactions in data.  We distinguish whether these interactions involve spillovers 
through the network or an even greater compounding of return-on-investments of marketing actions 
through a “social multiplier.”  We focus heavily on issues of measurement, considering (i) very 
specific requirements of primary and secondary data, (ii) modeling approaches that can help 
disentangle the contributors to the multiplier and hence the full effect of a marketing activity, and (iii) 
experiments which can uncover multipliers. 
Empirical analyses of social interactions seek to understand the manifestation of some underlying 
model of individual behavior in observed data. We structure our summary of empirical analyses of 
social interactions around whether relationships have the necessary characteristics to generate social 
multipliers, as opposed to spillovers.  A social multiplier arises in a dyadic relationship when both 
agents’ actions (or outcomes) are affected by the actions of the other agent and the agents recognize 
this, and internalize these effects, when selecting their actions.  We characterize such interactions as 
active, while a passive interaction involves at least one agent being unaffected by the actions of the 
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other.  We consider this distinction more formally in the following section, but the critical point is that 
a passive interaction lacks the feedback which generates the social multiplier.   
The relevance of the active vs. passive terminology can be illustrated by considering two historical 
approaches within the literature.  In disease spreading models, an agent’s probability of infection is a 
stochastic function of other agents’ infections. This forms the underpinnings of many approaches to 
social interactions, such as those in marketing derived from the Bass model (1969). These models 
evolve sequentially: adoption choices in one period are specified as a function of adoption choices in 
the previous period.  However, the lack of a forward component prevents adopters at one point in time 
from internalizing the impact of their action on future adoption decisions. As we discuss later, this 
feature makes these models passive because of the absence of a feedback loop.  
Active social interactions involve feedback loops that create interdependencies between the choices of 
individuals. In such situations, modeling approaches typically have to deal with issues of simultaneity 
and considerations of equilibria. Early considerations of equilibria between socially interacting 
individuals arose in the sociology literature with the work of Schelling (1971) and Granovetter (1978). 
More recently, models and approaches that explicitly model agents’ payoffs as a function of other 
agents’ choices or states have appeared in economics based models.  These models often require 
unique solutions to evaluate the effect of a stimulus that is subject to a social multiplier and involve a 
rigorous consideration of identification in data.  
Both passive and active interactions are causal in nature and have implications for policy in terms of 
magnifying the effect of agent-level policy interventions. A challenge for empirical work that tries to 
uncover social interactions from data on behavior is that both passive and active interactions are 
confounded with other spurious sources that generate correlation in observed behavior in the data. A 
key goal of empirical work has been to separate true causal interactions from these sources of spurious 
correlation. 
 
In terms of the organization of the paper, we first elaborate on passive versus active interactions both 
from a modeling point of view as well as from a policy outcome point of view. We use examples from 
the economics and marketing literatures to clarify and illustrate our discussion. The economics based 
approach to social interactions is valuable in that it allows for an empirically testable or estimable 
model to be specified, that captures behavioral relationships and specifies causal linkages among 
variables. However, there are many identification challenges in estimating such causal effects. We 
then discuss how additional data and experimental approaches (in the field) could help in overcoming 
these challenges.  
 
There are many types of social interactions too complex to be entirely captured within a simultaneous 
equations econometric model or simple field experiments. The sociology literature considers many 
different types of actions taken by an individual that can result in a variety of social structures. We 
therefore illustrate how researchers could use the richness of this approach to inform and guide 
econometric models. We then provide examples of marketing policy questions that research on social 
interactions can address and note how the rise of online media can prove to be a rich source of data. In 
conclusion we suggest some overall guidelines that could accelerate research in this area. 
Throughout, we argue that marketing researchers should seek to use models that distinguish causal 
effects between agents from other sources of correlated behavior. This will allow marketing 
researchers to measure policy-relevant effects that inform us about the full effects of marketing mix 
expenditure and allocation.  However, the detail and complexity of the data may in many cases prevent 
modeling or identification of causal effects. In these cases, a goal of this paper is to guide researchers 
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in making recommendations that reflect the degree of uncertainty that such data leave with respect to 
the presence and magnitude of social interactions effects.  
2 Modeling Social Interactions 
Models of social interactions begin with a framework of how an individual is affected by others in his 
reference group. The reference group is simply the set of other agents whose behavior the focal agent 
can be affected by. This definition is broad, and can include all other agents in the economy (“macro”-
level models), or small social groups (“micro”-level models).  
 
Social interactions are of key interest to marketers and policy makers due to the presence of social 
spillovers and social multipliers. A social spillover arises when an intervention or marketing action to 
an agent affects the behavior of others in his reference group via a social interaction. In some cases, 
social interactions also incorporate a feedback loop such that the changed behavior of the group 
induced by a marketing action to the focal agent, feeds back to reinforce the focal agent’s action. This 
in turn changes the behavior of the group, until a steady-state is attained. In such situations, social 
interactions also engender a social multiplier that multiplies the effect of the intervention to the initial 
agent. From a normative point of view, spillovers and multipliers may vastly increase the return-on-
investment to policy interventions, and hence are of significant interest to firms. From a positive point 
of view, spillovers and multipliers can help explain large observed variation in economic outcomes of 
interest, even in spite of small changes in underlying primitives.  
 
To clarify the distinction between spillovers and multipliers, we first present a simple linear model of 
social interactions between two agents. We use the model to explain what underlying primitives of the 
interaction generate spillovers in some contexts, and multipliers in others. We then use these 
implications as a basis of developing a useful taxonomy to interpret extant models in the literature.  
2.1 Spillovers and Multipliers 
We model social interactions via a simultaneous equations framework. We consider a group composed 
of two agents i and j taking an action, a. The actions form the outcome variable of interest. Denote ai 
and aj as the actions of agents i and j respectively.  We write,  
ai = βixi + γiaj + μizj + ui    (1.1)  
aj = βjxj + γjai + μjzi + uj      (1.2)  
where xi are characteristics of agent i and zj is a characteristics pertaining to agent j that affects i’s 
outcome (analogously for j).  We think of zj as exogenous in that it is not chosen by either i or j.  β and 
μ respectively measure the effect of these variables on outcomes, which are allowed to be agent-
specific. The u’s are unobservables or errors affecting outcomes. Here, the γ-s are parameters 
measuring the causal effect of one agent’s actions on another, while the μ-s are parameters measuring 
the causal effect of one agent’s characteristics on one another. For now, we assume that both x and z 
are exogenous.  
 
Social multiplier: The system of equations specified above engenders a social multiplier if γi ≠ 0 and γj 
≠ 0, and are of the same sign. In this case, i’s action affects j’s action and vice versa, such that i’s 
action feeds back upon itself through γj then γi.  The multiplier occurs because a small increase in aj 
increases ai through γi, which in turn increases aj even more through γj, and so on, until an equilibrium 
is attained. The term social multiplier is used because a change in xi, for example, will have a greater 
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total effect than βi on ai because of the feedback through γj and γi. The key for a multiplier to arise 
therefore is that actions of members have a direct, similar effect on each other.  
 
Social Spillover: There are two cases in which social interactions exist, but create spillovers instead of 
multipliers.  The first is the case of an asymmetry in which one agent’s action does not affect the 
other, e.g. if γj = 0, and γi ≠ 0.  In this case, there is no multiplier because a small change in xj will shift 
aj via βj, and shift ai via γi. However, since γj = 0, there is no feedback loop, and the effect on aj is 
limited to βj.  The second case of a spillover without a multiplier arises when γi = γj = 0, but μi ≠ 0 or 
μj ≠ 0. This social interaction results in a spillover since an increase in zj caused for instance, by 
changing marketing effort to j, also affects i via μi. However, since the γ-s are 0, there is no feedback 
from j back to i, and hence, there is no multiplier.1  
 
Finally, note that in the presence of either kind of social interactions, whether involving actions or 
characteristics, the outcome variables ai and aj will be correlated. The goal of econometric work is to 
use the observed correlation in actions between members, to identify the causal effects, γ-s and μ-s. 
Note that correlation can also arise if the unobservables ui and uj are correlated. This spurious 
correlation does not result in any spillovers or multipliers, and is therefore not policy-relevant.  
 
An extension: Word-of-mouth 
 
The model above captures social interactions arising through inter-related outcomes ai and aj.  
However, many social interactions, such as word-of-mouth (WOM) do not involve a direct 
relationship between the outcomes of group members.  Suppose zj represents word-of-mouth from 
individual j that affects the outcome of individual i.  Furthermore, to focus on WOM effects, assume 
for the moment that γi = γj = 0.  Without an extension of the model, and under the assumption that 
E[zjui] = 0, the μ-s are identified and measure the effect of WOM.  However, it is possible the WOM is 
endogenously chosen by agents, and hence viewed as an action, rather than a characteristic.  We 
therefore introduce a more general specification of z: 
 
zi = θwi + λaj + δai  + ei     (2.1) 
zj = θwj + λai + δaj  + ej      (2.2) 
 
where w may include variables in x, as well as other variables not contained in x.2  Conceptually, i’s 
word of mouth to j, zi, depends on his characteristics wi, unobservables ei, as well as his actions ai, and 
the actions of member j, aj. As an example, suppose the actions are the decisions to adopt a new 
technology. The above model says that i’s decision to send WOM to j depends on whether i himself 
adopts, as well as how much i expects j to adopt.3 Based on the two sets of inter-related simultaneous 
                                                 
1 Manski (2000) refers to the presence of  γ  in both interacting agents equations as an endogenous social effect 
and μ as an exogenous social effect. 
2 We do not index the parameters θ, λ and δ by the indices i and j for expositional simplicity; but conceptually, 
these parameters can be individual-specific. 
3 We could generalize further without any change in the substantive implications of our argument, that only the 
expected action of j drives i’s decision to send WOM: e.g.  
zi = θwi + λEiaj + δai  + ei 
zj = θwj + λai + δEjaj  + ej 
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equations models, a WOM-based social multiplier only occurs if both of the δ-s are nonzero.  In such a 
case, ai affects zi (through δ), which in turn affects aj (through μj), which cycles back to ai through zj.  
An example of this might be pre-release anticipation for a movie or new technology product such as 
the Apple iPhone. If a measures individual’s latent utilities for eventually buying the iPhone, a WOM-
based multiplier may exaggerate these latent utilities because an individual is more likely to talk about 
the iPhone to others the more he likes it (δ’s effect on z). This WOM can lead to a reinforcement of his 
latent utility if his talking about the iPhone increases the other agents’ latent utility and how much she 
in turn talks about it. 
 
Sequential decisions 
 
Finally, note that multipliers inherently arose in the above contexts due to the simultaneous nature of 
decision-making. We now consider the question of whether multipliers of this sort disappear in 
interaction contexts where decisions are made sequentially. Let t denote time, and suppose only one 
agent can take an action in each period. This may be the case because decision-making in the group is 
known a priori to be sequential or because the analyst formulates the problem in continuous-time with 
infinitely small time increments.4 Suppose i takes an action in period t conditioning on j’s action in 
period t-1, following which j takes an action in period t+1, conditioning on i’s action in period t. 
Suppose the model generating the actions ait and aj,t+1 is, 
 ( )
( )
, 1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
argmax , , , ,
argmax , , , ,
it j t it jt it
a
j t it j t i t j t
a
a V a a x z u
a V a a x z u
−
+ + + +
⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦
 
 
where V is the agent’s present-discounted payoffs given action a.  For the moment, consider one 
iteration of this process for each agent. A social multiplier arises in this context, if a small change in xit 
increases ait through a feedback effect via the action aj,t+1.  This arises if i is forward-looking and 
anticipates that his action ait would change aj,t+1.  To clarify, let vi(.) and vj(.) denote i and j’s 
immediate payoff from the action. Then, a social multiplier is generated if one can write,  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
− − + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + +
= +
= +
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
, 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 2 , 2
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 3 , 2 , 3 , 3 , 3
, , , , , , , , , , , , 3.1
, , , , , , , , , , , , 3
it j t it jt it i it j t it jt it i t j t i t j t i t
j t it j t i t j t j j t it j t i t j t j t i t j t i t j t
V a a x z u v a a x z u E V a a x z u
V a a x z u v a a x z u E V a a x z u ( ).2
 
In the above equation, a small change in xit changes vi(.) and thus affects ait.  This in turn, shifts aj,t+1 
via vj(.).  However, since the term in expectations in (3.1) above is a function of aj,t+1, there is an 
additional feedback effect on ait. Hence, a social multiplier can still arise in this system. Intuitively, in 
sequential decision-making, a social multiplier may arise if each agent making a move incorporates 
that his action today will change the behavior of the agents in his group tomorrow. This is naturally 
satisfied in most models of dynamic forward-looking interactions. 
 
Discussion and a Taxonomy 
 
To formalize the source of multipliers in social interactions, we characterize an interaction as passive 
if the feedback loop does not exist.  A passive social interaction therefore arises when one agent in a 
dyadic relationship either is not affected by the other or does not recognize the effect of their outcome 
                                                 
4 As Doraszelski and Judd (2007) point out, a continuous time model does not have simultaneity because only 
one agent can act at an instantaneous point in time. 
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on the other when choosing it.  In contrast, an active social interaction arises when both agents in a 
dyadic relationship affect one another similarly (i.e. the interaction effects have the same sign) and 
recognize the effect of their outcome on the other when choosing it.  An active social interaction may 
therefore manifest itself in a simultaneous decision context as in Equation (1) above or in a dynamic 
decision context in which a future outcome of another agent affects the payoffs of the agent’s current 
action/outcome as in Equation (3) above.  
 
The necessity of modeling agents’ actions requires the corresponding models to take a stand on 
whether to specify formally agent’s preferences, information sets and the equilibria being played. 
Structural models of active interactions spell out the incentives and payoffs associated with agent’s 
actions, and explicitly model some combination of agents’ preferences, information sets and 
equilibria. Reduced form models of active interactions are consistent with structural models, but are 
typically agnostic about the explicit definition of these fundamentals, focusing more on consistent 
estimation of social effects with minimal assumptions. 
 
The distinction made above between active and passive social interactions has important implications 
for policy. Passive interactions imply that a firm or policy maker’s stimulus to a member of a social 
group will spill over to others within that group. Active interactions have this feature, but also produce 
a social multiplier. Formally, agents’ actions in active social interactions are strategic complements. 
As is well known, in the presence of strategic complements, small changes in underlying preferences 
can result in large changes in aggregate outcomes.  Finally, the presence of a feedback loop has 
important implications for the estimation of social interactions because it often implies a simultaneity 
issue and requires some consideration of equilibrium phenomena. This forms one aspect of the 
challenge of identifying social interactions from behavioral data. We consider these identification 
issues in more detail below. 
 
2.2 The Identification problem 
In confronting data, all non-experimental analyses of social interactions, whether passive or active, 
using either structural or reduced form models, are subject to an identification problem. The 
identification problem arises due to the challenge of separating correlations in observed behavior from 
true causal effects of one agent on another. In the remainder of this section, we first describe sources 
of this identification problem and another that may exaggerate estimated effects of social interactions. 
Second, we discuss extant models in the literature. 
 
Correlation in observed choices among agents within a reference group is a necessary empirical 
feature of data in the presence of social interactions. An identification challenge arises because factors 
other than causal effects of agents’ actions on each other can create spurious correlations in behavior. 
Only causal effects can result in a social interaction effect. Hence, uncovering causal effects accurately 
is key to formulating marketing and social policy. The primary confounding factors are endogenous 
group formation, correlated unobservables, and simultaneity. These issues were first formally laid out 
by Manski (1993) and Moffitt (2001) in the context of a linear model of social interactions. We 
provide a discussion of these issues, and discuss potential solutions to the identification problem 
outlined in the literature since then. 
2.2.1 Endogenous group formation 
The endogenous group formation problem arises because agents with similar tastes may tend to form 
social groups; hence, subsequent correlation in their behavior may reflect these common tastes, and 
not a causal effect of one’s behavior on another. For example, in the application of Nair et al. (2006) to 
measuring social interactions in physician prescription behavior, many general practitioner physicians 
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tend to meet specialist physicians at conferences, some hosted by drug companies, which are 
organized around specific disease-conditions and therapeutic treatment options. Correlation in 
prescriptions between general practitioners and specialists can thus arise if preferences for treatment-
options that make doctors tend to attend these events also relate to their tastes for drug prescription. 
Alternatively, in the application of Hartmann and Yildiz (2006) to modeling social interactions in golf 
demand, correlations in observed golfing activity between two partners may simply be driven by 
common tastes for golf that induced them to form a group in the first place. A researcher cannot 
therefore conclude directly from observed correlation in behavior that there exists a causal effect of an 
agent’s prescription or golfing behavior on the prescription or golfing decisions respectively, of others 
in his reference group.  
 
One solution to the endogeneity of group formation is facilitated by the availability of panel data. With 
panel data one can control for endogenous group formation via agent fixed effects (e.g. Nair et al. 
2006), or by including a rich specification for heterogeneity (e.g. Hartmann and Yildiz 2006). Both 
fixed and random effects here serve the role of picking up common aspects of group tastes. In other 
contexts, researchers can directly model the process of group formation (Bala and Goyal 2000, Glaeser 
and Scheinkman 2001, Conley and Udry 2003). Nonparametric identification in the latter contexts is 
similar to selection models (e.g. Lee 1982), and requires an exclusion restriction, i.e. a variable that 
affects the propensity to join a group, but not subsequent behavior. Given the data requirements, 
studies that attempt this approach are rare.  
2.2.2 Correlated unobservables 
A second source of correlation is correlated unobservables (to the econometrician) that drive the actions 
of all agents in a reference group similarly. The inclusion of fixed or random effects mitigates the 
correlated unobservables problem to some extent, since these control for time-invariant aspects of 
unobservables driving agents’ behavior. In some contexts, one can use a difference-in-difference 
strategy of using the behavior of other agents not in the focal agent’s reference group to control for 
common unobservables (e.g. Nair et al. 2006.) With large enough groups, one can also feasibly think 
of differencing out common unobservables by modeling differences in behavior within a group, as 
opposed to levels themselves. 
2.2.3 Simultaneity 
Finally, a simultaneity problem arises due to the potentially simultaneous nature of decisions by the 
focal agent and others in his reference group. Due to simultaneity, correlation in subsequent actions 
could simply reflect the fact that the agents’ decision affects the group’s behavior, and at the same 
time, the group’s behavior affects the agent’s behavior. This has been referred to as the “reflection 
problem” in the literature (c.f. Manski 1993). Exclusion restrictions are the most accessible 
identification approach to solving the simultaneity problem. The researcher needs an instrumental 
variable that affects a focal agent’s decision, but can be a priori excluded from the decision of others in 
his reference group. Nair et al. (2006) discuss how this approach may be used to achieve identification. 
Nam et al. (2006) and Tucker (2006) use this identification strategy in the related context of measuring 
local network effects among agents in the adoption of new technology. Alternatively, researchers can 
directly model the equilibrium being played to solve the simultaneity problem. This is the strategy 
adopted by Hartmann and Yildiz (2006). An alternative exclusion restriction imposes a temporal 
ordering i.e., the focal individual’s behavior in time (t+1) is affected by the group behavior up to time 
(t) (see Manchanda et al. 2004 for an example). However, a caveat to this identification strategy is that 
unobservables should not be correlated over time, and agents must be assumed not to be forward 
looking (i.e., agents are passive).   
 
Each of the three factors discussed above could generate spurious correlation in observed actions, 
which when not controlled for, may lead to the misattribution of correlated behavior to causal social 
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interaction effects or biases in the estimates of the causal effects. We wish to emphasize for the reader 
that these issues are pervasive in all empirical settings that try to identify social interaction effects 
using behavioral data, irrespective of model specification or functional form assumptions.  
 
We now discuss the extant models in the literature. We first discuss models with passive social 
interactions, and then present a discussion of active social interactions. For each, we also discuss how 
the identification problems discussed above have been addressed. 
2.3 Models of Passive Social Interactions 
2.3.1 Epidemiology/Disease Spreading Models 
Many models of social interactions and contagion have their roots in the epidemiology literature, 
which has as its goal the forecasting of the rate of growth of diseases in the population. These models 
typically consider agents as being in one of three states: susceptible (S), infected (I) or recovered (R). 
The primitives of the model are the disease-specific probabilities by which agents randomly move 
from one state to another. Of key interest is the reproduction rate, R0 = ß/γ, where ß is the probability 
of a movement from state S to state I, and γ is the probability of movement from state I to state R. A 
disease with R0 > 1 is termed an epidemic. These models treat agents as passive because agents’ states 
stochastically change based on the state of their reference group (i.e. actions, preferences and tradeoffs 
are not explicitly modeled) rather than having the potential to feedback on themselves.  The basic 
disease-spreading model does not control for agent heterogeneity and is susceptible to the endogenous 
group selection problem (the agent may choose to not be in a group or area that has high prevalence of 
the disease). Correlated unobservables may also be an issue: for example, two agents in a community 
may have caught the disease because they were both exposed to the germ sequentially and developed 
symptoms sequentially.  However, their visits to the location of the germ is unobserved to the 
econometrician, and hence, he may conclude from the observed data that the first agent infected the 
second. 
  
One can generate differing models of contagion from the basic epidemiological framework by 
specifying various specifications of the probability of state transitions. The framework has been 
successfully applied in marketing via the Bass (1969) model to studying aggregate patterns of 
diffusion of new products. A useful distinction for such network models is between a pure mixing 
model (e.g., Bass 1969 discussed below) and a network spatial model. Network spatial models 
explicitly model network topology and illustrate how the specific network structure can sometimes 
generate novel and different insights on the diffusion process (e.g., Durett, 1999). We refer the 
interested reader to Van den Bulte and Wuyts (2007) for more detail on network models. 
 
2.3.2 Bass Model 
The Bass model is a particular instance of an epidemiological model in which the probability by which 
an individual catches a “social contagion” is linearly related to the number of others in the agents’ 
reference group (in this case, the entire economy), that are in that state (i.e. ß = p + q*n(I)). Diffusion 
is analogous to the process by which a disease spreads, and an epidemic is a product that has “taken-
off”. The particular specification of the probability of social contagion implies a positive concave 
relationship between sales and the installed base, which is also commonly observed in aggregate 
diffusion data. Hence, the Bass model can provide a good fit to the temporal distribution of many 
aggregate sales data. The reader should also note that this pattern is potentially consistent with other 
explanations, including serial correlation in sales-related unobservables over time. In the absence of 
micro-data, the fact that that current sales is statistically significantly related to the installed base is 
consistent with, but not evidence of, social interactions at the agent level. Further, as noted by Glaeser 
et al. (2003), in the presence of social interactions at the individual-level, models estimated on 
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aggregate data are liable to be subject to large aggregation biases that exaggerate the extent of 
individual-level social interactions. Hence, “q coefficient-s” in a Bass model are less suited for an 
interpretation as causal measures of social contagion, and are more appropriately interpreted as 
descriptive parameters capturing the dependence of current aggregate sales on the past installed base 
of the product. In terms of prediction, the Bass model is a simple tool, and has difficulty forecasting 
temporal heterogeneity and high variability in adoption rates.  Watts et al. (2005) develop a model that 
captures these observed features of adoption data. 
2.3.3 Spatial Models 
An alternative class of models seeks to flexibly describe the correlations that exist in the observed 
choices of agents within a reference group. These papers trace their origins to the spatial econometrics 
literature (Anselin 1998, 2001), which seeks to flexibly describe correlations in observed data among 
contiguous spatial units or entities. Models for social interactions in this class specify correlation 
structures such that responses by individuals near one another in location or attribute space generate 
similar outcomes. These models are reduced-form representations of a social interaction model that 
may be either active or passive. Yang and Allenby (2003) consider the decision of consumers to buy 
foreign or domestic automobiles. The idea is that consumers in certain regions may wish to coordinate 
on one of these choices. They model the interrelatedness of these decisions through correlations in 
underlying preferences. Such correlations may be the result of individuals’ desires to buy similar 
autos, but could also be the result of common unobserved beliefs, such as patriotism.  The model thus 
fits the data of a social interaction, but does not actually distinguish whether an interaction is present. 
3 Models of Active Social Interactions 
We now discuss active models of social interaction. These models originated in sociology, and are 
grounded in sociological and economic theory. We first discuss the linear-in-means model, which is a 
canonical example from the literature. We then discuss non-linear discrete choice models of social 
interactions. The latter raises an additional issue related to multiplicity of possible equilibria. We 
discuss potential approaches to solving this problem. We then discuss the sociology literature that 
leads the research uncovering the rich nature in which payoffs and actions of agents build observed 
social structures. We conclude the section with a discussion of the challenges faced by the empirical 
literature from incorporating such richly defined social structures. 
 
We begin with continuous actions because they can often be represented using a simple linear model. 
We then consider discrete choice models when the actions or states of others in the reference group 
enter the choice probabilities of agents.  
3.1 Linear Models of Social Interactions 
The linear-in-means model is a specification in which the actions of an agent are linearly related to the 
characteristics, as well as the mean behavior of others in his reference group. The linear-in-means 
model can be interpreted as a structural model in which agent’s preferences are such that actions are a 
linear function of other’s actions, or as a linear approximation to the reduced form implied by a non-
linear model. An example of this model in marketing is Nair et al. (2006.) We believe that a discussion 
of the linear model is instructive because, a) it has been a popular model in empirical work, and b) it 
serves to illustrate the notion of equilibrium, as well as the associated identification challenges clearly. 
The linear-in-means framework captures active interactions because it considers the effect of an 
agent’s action on the actions of others in his reference group. 
 
Simultaneity arises in this model because social interactions are symmetric in the sense that an agents 
action’s affect the actions of other agents in the group. Manski (1993) defines this as the “reflection” 
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problem - group behavior affects i’s behavior, which, in turn, affects the group’s behavior. Referring 
back to the equations in section 2.1, the solution to the system of equations is the equilibrium for the 
group. It can be shown that γ and μ — i.e. the causal social interaction effect and the “exogenous 
social effects” — are separately identified only if the errors of the structural form of the equation are 
uncorrelated. Moffit (2001) lays out the argument and illustrates that the endogenous social effect, γ, 
can be recovered from the variance/covariance terms of the reduced form of the model. There are two 
reasons why the errors of the structural equation may be correlated, hence preventing identification of 
γ.  First, if individuals formed groups based on common tastes (i.e. endogenous group formation), 
there may be a fixed effect common to both individuals in the group. Second, the individuals may be 
exposed to common or correlated unobservables.  In either case, the convenience of identifying γ in 
the linear model from the reduced form variance covariance matrix breaks down. 
3.1.1 The Importance of Social Network Information 
A useful aspect of the analysis above is that it emphasizes the importance of obtaining exogenously 
defined social network information. In other words, one cannot use the correlation in observed 
behavior to bin agents into groups, and then subsequently use the correlation in the actions of the agent 
and those in these groups to study the effect of social interactions. A solution is to obtain social 
network information via direct elicitation from agents or from surveys (see for example, Nair et al. 
2007.) A related issue is that if information clearly defining the network is not available, correlated 
unobservables can be even more problematic For instance, without clear network information, a 
researcher may define the network based on geographic location (e.g. all persons in a zip code). In this 
case, it is difficult to separate the causal effect of members within the zip-code on each other from 
common zip-code level unobservables that affect all members similarly, and tend their behavior to be 
correlated.. 
3.2 Discrete Choice Models of Social Interactions 
While the linear model is appropriate for a wide range of situations, some choice contexts are non-
linear by definition. A typical example is decision contexts involving discrete choice. Discrete choice 
models of social interactions extend the typical latent random utility discrete choice model to include 
the action (or state) of one or more other agents. Specifying the payoff of an agent (A) to be the 
function of another agent’s (B’s) action is complicated by the fact that B’s action likely also depends 
on A’s. A typical approach in such cases is to use a game theoretic framework to determine which 
combinations of actions are possible equilibria. Once equilbria are defined, researchers can begin to 
define probabilities over observed choices. The empirical game-theoretic literature can be broadly 
classified as models with private information and models with complete information. The 
completeness aspect here refers to the nature of random shocks to agents’ payoff functions. In private 
information models, the random payoff shocks are only known by the agent directly affected by them, 
while in complete information models, they are common knowledge to all agents. In the remainder of 
this section, we briefly review these two approaches to modeling social interactions. 
3.2.1 Models with Incomplete Information 
Incomplete information discrete choice models of social interactions trace their origins to the 
sociology literature, in particular, to the pioneering work of Shelling (1971) and Grannovetter (1978). 
Shelling and Grannovetter described threshold models of social interactions, in which the marginal 
utility that some agents obtain from an action is an increasing function of the proportion of the 
population taking the similar action. Both Shelling’s and Grannovetter’s models result in a critical 
mass effect, such that once the proportion of the population choosing the action crosses a threshold 
point, only extreme outcomes are stable equilibria. Hence, around the threshold point, small changes 
in underlying preferences or small shocks to payoffs can result in large changes in aggregate 
outcomes. Formally, this is the multiple equilibria phenomena, which are pervasive in models with 
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strategic complementarities. The threshold effects here are analogous to critical mass effects found in 
models of network effects (for example, Economides and Himmelberg 1995), and has been referred to 
as “tipping” by the popular press (Gladwell 2000). The basic threshold models formed the kernel for 
cascade models in the mathematics, physics and computer science literatures that modeled networks 
as collections of connected agents differentiated by their vulnerability (Dodds and Watts 2004, 2005). 
The vulnerability of an agent is defined as the threshold number of connected agents that should take 
an action, before the agent himself would. Using both analytical tools and numerical techniques, Watts 
(2002) demonstrated that random networks with sufficiently connected clusters of vulnerables are 
susceptible to large-scale cascades.  These results extend the notion of critical mass on a network in 
that activating even a single individual could lead to a cascade throughout the vulnerable cluster (the 
critical mass) which in turn would lead to a cascade throughout the whole network. 
In parallel work, the critical mass model was extended by Brock and Durlauf (2001) who cast the 
model in terms of discrete choice. In their model, agent’s payoff functions for each choice are shifted 
by the expected actions of others in their reference group, as well as agent-specific errors similar to 
standard random-utility models of discrete choice. The random payoff errors are given a private 
information interpretation, in the sense that they are observable to the focal agent, but not to others in 
the reference group. An equilibrium in the model is a self-consistent set of probabilities for all agents 
such that the expected actions of all agents within a group coincide with the actual probabilities of 
choice. The equilibrium satisfies a fixed point condition which facilitates the solution of the 
equilibrium probabilities. As expected, the fixed-point is not unique, i.e. there are multiple equilbiria. 
The presence of multiple equilibria creates challenges for empirical work – we return to this point 
below. Bajari, Hong, Kranier and Nekipelov (2006) discuss identification in models analogous to the 
Brock and Durlaff-framework. The requirements for nonparametric identification are familiar: 
analogous to standard discrete choice models, the payoff from one of the actions needs to be 
normalized. Further, the researcher needs an exclusion restriction such that one of the variables 
shifting the payoff of a focal agent can be excluded from the payoff functions of other agents in his 
reference group. 
3.2.2 Models with Complete Information 
In some settings with small reference groups, complete information may likely be a more reasonable 
assumption. In such contexts, the model of agents’ actions is a discrete game. Following Bresnahan 
and Reiss (1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility 
depends on the actions of other players. Empirical models of discrete games have traditionally been 
defined for and applied to firms competing with one another (see the paper by Draganska et al. (2008) 
in this issue for a more detailed description and analysis of this literature), but the basic model can also 
be adapted to individuals interacting with one another. Hartmann and Yildiz (2006) is an example that 
illustrates how the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) depictions of equilibria are easily adapted to 
individuals coordinating decisions. While their model is applied to a problem of small scale (two 
players and two possible actions), the paper describes many of the social interaction identification 
issues within the context of structural estimation. For instance, the heterogeneity specification can be 
used to account for endogenous group formation and the equilibrium model can account for 
simultaneity biases.   
Empirical researchers using either class of models above must confront the problem of multiple 
equilibria. Note that multiplicity is a feature of the non-linearity of the model (i.e. the linear model has 
a unique equilibrium). Below, we provide a brief discussion of the multiple equilibria problem, and 
discuss potential solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature.  
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3.2.3 Multiple equilibria 
The actions of agents in many of the above social interactions models are strategic complements, and 
hence, these models are particularly prone to multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria create 
complications for empirical work since there may be multiple outcomes that are equilibria for a given 
set of parameters, observable variables and unobservable variables of the agents. This implies that 
researchers must know which equilibria would be played before being able to define a likelihood for 
the data. Unfortunately, theory offers little guidance on which equilibria would actually be played, and 
hence it is a priori difficult to rule out alternative equilibria. One approach proposed by Bajari, Hong 
and Ryan (2004) is to estimate an equilibrium selection equation. This would be the reasonable 
approach in most applications, but it requires an exclusion restriction: the researcher must have 
available a variable which affects the equilibrium chosen but does not affect the payoffs of the agents 
involved. In many cases, it may be impossible to find such a variable. In cases where such a variable is 
not available, researchers have typically defined an equilibrium selection rule which sorts between the 
equilibria.  A common example is to assume the equilibria which maximizes total surplus is always 
chosen. In the case of social interactions models, Hartmann and Yildiz (2006) note that the equilibria 
that maximizes total surplus also often is Pareto dominant such that it makes all agents better off. This 
suggests that such equilibrium selection rules may be more reasonable in the context of social 
interactions models. Similar approaches have also been suggested in the context of empirical games 
with network effects (Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran 2006). A final approach is to condition on the 
equilibrium that was actually played in the data, and to obtain initial estimates of the rules describing 
agent’s actions from the data, given the chosen equilibrium. This is the approach followed in the 
recent literature on two-step estimation of dynamic games (see Bajari, Benkard and Levin 2007, and 
the references cited therein.) While this solves the estimation problem in many situations, the 
researcher is still confronted with the issue of picking an equilibrium when using the estimates to 
simulate counterfactuals. Addressing these concerns remains an open area for future research. 
3.2.4 Models with Forward-Looking Consumers 
While the preceding describes models of static games, or repeated static games, many social 
interactions involve agents interacting repeatedly in environments where past and future actions and 
states are also relevant.  Dynamic empirical models of social interactions involve all of the estimation 
issues discussed above, plus the complexities of estimating dynamic interactions. To appreciate the 
complexity, typical social interaction models with incomplete information involve a nested fixed point 
algorithm that finds the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the expected actions of agents. The 
computational challenge in a typical dynamic choice model involves solving a nested fixed point 
problem to obtain the value functions measuring the discounted present value associated with states 
and actions. A dynamic empirical model of social interactions needs to solve both computational 
challenges. These models broadly fall into the empirical dynamic games literature. Fortunately, the 
recent two-step estimation approach defined by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) allows for 
estimation of some types of dynamic games. 
There have been a few recent applications of these models in the context of network effects. Ryan and 
Tucker (2006) consider the adoption of a video-conferencing technology by employees of a given 
firm. The dynamics arise from the fact that adopting the technology involves incurring an adoption 
cost, but the adoption allows an employee to use the technology to communicate in all future periods. 
Implicitly the adoption decision is driven by the utility the individual obtains from communicating 
with other adopters. An appealing aspect of their application is that they recognize that the calling 
behavior between groups of individuals informs the model about the desirability of adoption.  They 
consider active agents in terms of the adoption decisions (though not the calling decisions) and 
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heterogeneous types of agents that can pick up behaviors similar to those defined in the threshold 
models from the mathematics literature. 
Another paper considering dynamic network effects is Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta (2007). They 
consider the indirect network effects arising in markets with platforms and compatible software to 
analyze how agent’s forward looking behavior affects the presence/rate of tipping in the market. An 
important contribution of this paper is that it estimates the dynamic demand side using the two-step 
methods mentioned above, but explicitly solves the dynamic equilibrium model on the supply side to 
evaluate counterfactuals. 
These ambitious papers take the first steps into the field of dynamic empirical models of social 
interactions.  In terms of the identification issues discussed throughout this paper, the equilibrium 
models should help with simultaneity concerns, however both papers do have interaction elements that 
are not modeled in an equilibrium framework.5 One limitation of the two-step method is that 
unobserved heterogeneity is not accommodated. This could create concerns over endogenous group 
formation, but both papers circumvent this by estimating the models for a single pre-defined group 
(the firm in Ryan and Tucker 2006, and the market of all potential platform holders in Dube, Hitsch 
and Chintagunta, 2007). Estimation within groups all also helps with the common unobservables 
problem, so long as the common unobservables are not systematically varying over time. 
3.3 Field Experiments 
As has been noted till now, the identification of peer effects in social networks is a non-trivial task and 
is usually obtained by either having very high-quality data or imposing structure and using specific 
functional forms. One solution may be to exploit a natural experiment where there is random 
assignment of agents into groups (e.g. Sacerdote 2001 who studies peer effects on scholastic 
achievement of freshmen who were randomly assigned to roommates at Dartmouth college). The 
confinement to natural experiments is nevertheless, limiting. One possible way to avoid the necessity 
of either of the above is to carry out experiments directly in the field. The main idea is to exogenously 
vary the treatment (e.g., a marketing message) across subjects who have been randomly assigned to 
some treatment groups, as well as to a control group. Fairly straightforward analyses can then be used 
to verify the existence of the peer effect as well as to estimate the effect size. For example, Katz, Kling 
and Liebman (2001) use data from the Moving to Opportunity experiment to test for neighborhood 
effects on juvenile crime.  Duflo and Saez (2003) is another experimental example involving word-of-
mouth effects between employees deciding on retirement plans. In general however, there is a lack of 
studies that employ this approach – a situation that we hope changes in the future. 
It is worth noting, however, that while field experiments are conceptually appealing, they can be 
problematic to implement in practice. Some common problems in these studies is obtaining buy-in 
from firms to carry out such studies (as almost always one of the experimental groups is worse-off), 
the actual cost of the study, low response rates, data recording problems and lack of foresight to 
include enough treatments in order to provide an explanation for the detected effect or effect size. 
Some researchers have turned successfully to the web as experiments are scalable, it is easy to track 
behavior and outcomes can also be measured cleanly (e.g. Salganik, Watts and Dodds 2006). 
However, some online experiments suffer from high attrition rates and operational issues. Generally, 
online experiments are difficult productions that are best designed to be game-like or fun and provide 
feedback to be appealing to participants. 
                                                 
5 Ryan and Tucker (2006) model the calling behavior in a reduced-form manner while specifying the equilibrium 
over the employee adoption decisions and Dubé, Hitsch and Chintagunta (2007) model the software industry in a 
reduced-form manner while specifying the equilibrium over the decisions of consumers and platform suppliers. 
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Some other researchers have focused more on field studies, rather than field experiments. In such 
studies, researchers do not explicitly create treatment and control groups but try and measure 
(exogenously varying) stimuli and correlate them with outcomes of interest. For example, Godes and 
Mayzlin (2007), enroll loyal and non-loyal customers of a retail chain and encourage them to generate 
(positive) word-of-mouth for the chain to “close” peers (family and friends) and “far” peers 
(acquaintances). They then correlate the sales of the retail chain at the location of the enrollees as a 
function of the generated word-of-mouth. They find a main effect of word-of-mouth as well as that 
word-of-mouth seems more persuasive on far peers rather than close peers. In addition, word-of-
mouth generated by non-loyal customers is more effective than that generated by loyal customers. 
Note that while field studies may involve some intervention by the researchers, without an 
experimental design in place, the identification challenges are usually similar to those using revealed 
data. 
3.4 Sociological inquiry into social interactions 
There is of course a very strong tradition of work on social interaction in the sociology literature. The 
classic work that initiated a vast body of research over the last 40 years is the Medical Innovation 
study (Coleman et al. 1966). This was followed by other groundbreaking studies such as Schelling 
(1971), Granovetter (1973, 1978) and Burt (1987) to name a few. The focus of this literature has 
changed over time from whether people’s behavior was affected by social interaction to who was 
affected, followed by why and how. There is now a rich and varied set of insights that have emerged 
from this literature based on the questions of who is affected, why s/he is affected and how this effect 
propagates. Generally speaking, these insights have yet to be incorporated into econometric models of 
the type discussed above and are likely to prove a rich source of ideas that can be taken to data and 
models.  
Perhaps the richness of this literature can be best exemplified by an example – the role of “status” and 
its effect on the extent and nature of social interactions. Status can be defined as an intangible asset 
that is “possessed” by an individual or organization that is highly regarded by others that are highly 
regarded.6  The career-related consequences of status, especially for scientists, were brought into relief 
by Merton who used narrative data (interviews, writings etc.) to describe how, under a variety of 
situations, individuals of high status obtained disproportionate rewards relative to individuals of low 
status for equivalent levels of output or effort (Merton 1968). For instance, if two academics coauthor 
a paper, the higher status contributor reaps the lion share of the credit.  The same is thought to occur 
when two scientists independently make the same discovery. Merton named this the “Matthew Effect” 
– an effect that has been documented widely since (for a discussion of influential models of status 
effects in markets and the boundary conditions of the Matthew effect, see Podolny (2005). In addition 
to rewards, the Matthew effect also influences outcomes such as the propagation and establishment of 
ideas in social networks. An indirect illustration of this effect may be seen in Nair et al. (2007) where 
opinion leader physicians influence the behavior of physicians but not the other way around. 
More recent research in sociology focuses on providing a richer description of status along with 
metrics that allow us to measure status. For example, Bothner et al (2007), allow for status to be 
multidimensional.  The hypothesized dimensions of status in this work are “primary status” (as above) 
and “complementary status” (where status is based on being in demand by highly regarded others for 
an auxiliary role e.g., as a team member rather than a leader). They develop metrics for measuring 
                                                 
6 We use the term possessed carefully because, unlike financial or physical capital, status is a form of social 
capital and therefore owned only in part by the individual or organization, whose audience--capable of 
withdrawing at any time the esteem and recognition on which status rests--also acts as a part owner (cf. Burt 
1992) 
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both kinds of status and use them to investigate the performance of venture capital firms. They find 
that, net of primary status, complementary status has a positive effect on firm performance. 
Interestingly, they find that the two types of status interact negatively, suggesting that each kind of 
status corresponds to a distinct role in the market. 
From a marketing standpoint, these additional dimensions describing social networks can serve as a 
useful guideline in terms of allocating marketing resources to different parts of the network based on 
expected flows and outcomes. 
4 Applicability to Marketing and Policy Effects 
There are many potential applications of social interactions to marketing. We have already discussed 
many examples.  Other recent applications include television preference relationships between spouses 
(Yang et al., 2006), spatial diffusion of the use of an Internet grocer (Bell and Song, 2007), physician 
adoption of a new drug (Manchanda et al. 2004) and the effects of service quality and word of mouth 
on acquisition, usage and retention for a video on-demand service (Nam et al., 2006). The last 
application shows how popular metrics such as Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) can be understated if 
the social interaction effects (spillovers) are not accounted for. Virtually all these applications have 
found some evidence for the existence of social interaction effects, while the elaboration of the 
implications for marketing policy has varied across these studies. Another common factor underlying 
most of these studies is that measurement of the social network and the flow of interaction within the 
network has rarely been based on objective data (e.g, Bell and Song 2007 and Nam et al 2006 use 
geographic proximity to define networks). In terms of the future research, the rise of online media – 
online social networks, retail sites that explicitly allow and encourage interaction such as reviews and 
recommendations etc. - is an exciting development as the network, links and the flow of (electronic) 
information can be captured objectively (e.g., Trusov 2006). This has many advantages. For example, 
clearly defined network links can be helpful in that some common effects (to rule out correlated 
unobservables) may be estimated by comparing in-network agents with some individuals that may not 
be in any network.  
 
The use of such data also helps answer questions that have not received enough attention in the past. 
For example, in recent research, Narayan (2006) models network formation by fitting a model of the 
time until a link between individuals within a network will occur. Note that even in this case, the 
reference group is defined ex-ante despite the fact that the timing of connections within the reference 
group are modeled endogenously. In another interesting example, Fleder and Hosanagar (2007) 
examine the effect of recommender systems. Recommendation systems create social interactions 
indirectly by pooling the purchase behavior of similar agents to make recommendations to agents 
currently making purchase decisions online. The main question that is addressed in this research is 
whether such systems lead to a long-tail effect in sales by increasing diversity (via exposing 
consumers to idiosyncratic products that they may not have been aware of otherwise) or a reduction in 
diversity via a tipping effect. They find that, recommendation systems lead to a reduction in average 
sales diversity online.  Another related application is customer referrals.  Essentially, these involve 
word-of-mouth that can be measured or captured by the firm to properly incentivize customers to 
spread the word.  In fact, as online social networks develop and the data are more readily accessible to 
researchers and firms, elaborate compensation schemes may be able to reward influential network 
members on sites such as Facebook.com for the content and traffic they generate.       
 
Going forward, we believe that researchers should continue to focus on the development of models 
that distinguish causal effects arising from social interactions between agents from other sources of 
correlated behavior. This is crucial as policy implications for marketers can only be developed 
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conditional on finding such causal effects. Much work needs to be done in translating these effects to 
actual policy recommendations. From a dissemination point of view, another area of research that is 
likely to be of use to marketers is the development of easy to compute metrics that can be applied to 
market data quickly and easily. Finally, marketing scholars should be encouraged to make use of the 
rich insights on social interactions and networks developed in other disciplines (e.g., sociology and 
information systems) to develop methodology and provide policy implications. 
5 Conclusion 
We hope that the discussion so far has made it clear that there are many interesting questions related to 
social interactions in marketing. These range from tests of theories describing whether, why and how 
consumers and firms interact to network formation to applied questions about marketing resource 
allocation in the presence of social interactions. In conclusion, we would like to highlight two key 
points.   
 
First, the distinction between passive and active social interactions has very significant implications 
for the identification and magnitude of the effects of marketing policies.  While the spillover effect of 
a passive interaction may help marketing promotions, information, or more generally, policies, to 
spread through a network of individuals, an active type of social interaction magnifies effects even 
more. The reinforcing of agents’ behaviors under active interactions lead to large multipliers that result 
in significant aggregate effects of even small stimuli to a single agent.  While such interaction effects 
may be particularly appealing from a policy-makers’ point-of-view, active interactions involve 
simultaneity issues and potential multiple equilibria that affects both measurement and prediction.  
 
Second, whether interactions are expected to be passive or active, empirical applications should 
explicitly consider how identification problems such as correlated unobservables and endogenous 
group formation are addressed in the context of their data.  While we have been rigorous in drawing 
upon the literature in listing all the identification challenges, our intention is not to discourage 
researchers. Rather, our intention is to encourage research to continue to work in this area, while 
recognizing the boundaries of their analysis e.g. by pointing out potential confounds. Sources of 
exogeneity, well-defined groups and panel structure determine the scope of questions that can be 
addressed.  With limited natural sources of exogenous variation in the data and modeling which may 
be too complex to adapt to the extensiveness of the data, it may be best in many applications to avoid 
questions relying on cleanly identified causal effects.  In other words, statistical modeling which 
provides valuable data descriptors and predictors may be most useful. If causal effects in these social 
interaction environments are sought, the statistical patterns may help uncover networks and potential 
interactions that can be tested more explicitly using experimentation.  In summary, a wish list of social 
interactions data that we encourage practitioners to collect includes data that (i) relays the set of 
relationships between individuals so networks structures can be analyzed, (ii) measures actionable 
marketing variables such as purchases or page views for network members so profitability can be 
analyzed, and (iii) uses experimentation to allow researchers to at least measure a “treatment” effect of 
a stimulus such as advertising to the social network. 
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